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I. INTRODUCTION
An important undercurrent in Michael Reisman's work in international
human rights law is the law's utilitarian nature. True to the New Haven
School, he conceives of human rights not as self-evident and eternal
metaphysical truths but as part of the international community's program of
promoting shared, fundamental values in the face of fractious opposition by
those uncommitted to humanitarianism. And these values center primarily on
human life and happiness, or in his felicitous phrasing: "[T]he international
human rights program, when stripped of its own more recent mystical overlay,
is based on the notion that, in a crunch, human beings and not states matter."'
The mystical overlay includes a certain reification of human rights that, while
useful in advocacy, sometimes obscures the exceptionally mutable nature of
many human rights.
One human right in particular-the right to freedom from arbitrary
discrimination based on race, sex, or other status-presents special challenges
to the integrity of the mystical overlay. All of the major international human
rights instruments guarantee the right in some form, and some are specifically
oriented toward preventing certain kinds of discrimination.2 The uniqueness of
the nondiscrimination right arises from two seemingly contradictory aspects
of the right. On one hand, the right to equal treatment is a necessary and
central component of any coherent ethical system based a priori on the value
of human beings. On the other hand, it would be impossible and in any case
undesirable for the law even to approach treating all human beings equally.
This is the challenge of the nondiscrimination right in a nutshell.
There are several ways to approach discrimination as an expression of
the right to equality under law. One approach identifies a limited number of
grounds on which distinctions made, supported, or tolerated by a state
government will be considered presumptively illegitimate-I'll refer to this as
a "protected class approach" of nondiscrimination. Alternatively, distinctions
on any ground may be considered in need of justification under some standard
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of review if they result in the denial of a recognized human right-an "Article
14 ECHR approach" toward nondiscrimination. 3 Finally, one might consider
any governmental distinction between persons on any grounds to be
presumptively in need of justification-a "universal equal rights approach"
toward nondiscrimination.
II. PROTECTED CLASS APPROACH
Both Canada in its Charter of Rights and Freedoms4 and Human Rights
Act 1985, 5 and the United States through a collection of civil rights statutes,
take a protected class approach to nondiscrimination rights. Unlike the
Canadian Charter, the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution does
not specify that certain classes of persons benefit from equal protection rights
and others do not; it merely prohibits states from "deny[ing] to any person
within [their] jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."6 Congress has,
however, adopted legislation to protect specific classes of persons from public
and some kinds of private discrimination, most prominently in Title VII of the
1964 Civil Rights Act,7 the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,8 and the
Americans with Disabilities Act.9 The protection afforded to these classes is
not, however, uniform. The Supreme Court has interpreted the Constitution to
require that some grounds of discrimination, such as race, benefit from a
strong presumption of illegitimacy under the "strict scrutiny" standard.10 Sex
discrimination benefits from a heightened or "intermediate" level of
scrutiny. 1
But the grounds of discrimination omitted from these laws are as
important as-indeed, greatly outnumber-the grounds listed. Neither the
3. European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 14, Nov. 4, 1950,
213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter ECHR].
4. Section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms provides:
(1) Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal
protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without
discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age, or
mental or physical disability.
(2) Subsection (1) does not preclude any law, program or activity that has as its object
the amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged individuals or groups including those that
are disadvantaged because of race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age, or
mental or physical disability.
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the
Canada Act 1982, ch. 11, § 15.
5. Human Rights Act, R.S.C., ch. H-6 pt. 1, § 3 (1985) ("(1) For all purposes of this Act, the
prohibited grounds of discrimination are race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, age, sex, sexual
orientation, marital status, family status, disability and conviction for which a pardon has been granted.
(2) Where the ground of discrimination is pregnancy or child-birth, the discrimination shall be deemed
to be on the ground of sex.").
6. U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, § 1. This language is reflected in several human rights
conventions, but the conventions often include additional language clarifying prohibited grounds for
discrimination.
7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a, 2000d, 2000e-2, 2000bb to -4, 3604-3606 (2000).
8. 29 U.S.C. §§ 623, 631 (2000).
9. 29 U.S.C. §§ 706, 794 (2000); 42 U.S.C..§§ 12103-12213 (2000).
10. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
11. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495,
505-06 (1976).
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 34: 588
statutes nor the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Constitution requires
that the government justify with special persuasiveness discrimination based
on sexual orientation, political affiliation, marital status, parental status, birth
out of wedlock, wealth and economic status, youth, and many other rounds.
Distinctions on these grounds merely receive "rational basis" review, which
is applied with such deference to the political branches as to defy qualification
as a meaningful human right.' 3 In general, the U.S. government is free under
its domestic law to discriminate against many classes of persons on virtually
any ground other than a malicious desire to persecute some disfavored
minority group. In one rational review case, the Court's deference to the
political branches was sufficiently extreme to provoke Justice Stevens to
characterize it, with only the slightest exaggeration, as "tantamount to no
review at all."' 4
The justification for limiting equal rights under law to certain protected
classes is not entirely clear or consistent. In some cases, the greater sensitivity
to race has been explained by the "history of purposeful unequal treatment"'
' 5
or "unique disabilities on the basis of stereotyped characteristics not truly
indicative of their abilities."'16 The Court has also held that greater protection
is justified for the classes of persons who belong to a "discrete and insular"
group or who need "extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political
process."' 7 While these rationales are appealing, they are also inadequate to
explain the Court's jurisprudence; many other classifications, such as sexual
orientation, religion, socioeconomic class, and political affiliation (e.g.,
membership in the Communist Party), should qualify for heightened
protection under these tests but do not in fact benefit from strict scrutiny
review. The Court has rarely offered any kind of cogent explanation or cited
any evidence to support its denial of meaningful scrutiny to discrimination
against these groups. For example, in denying heightened scrutiny to
discrimination against children born out of wedlock, the Court acknowledged
the history of purposeful, unequal treatment against such children, the fact that
the status was involuntary, and the fact that they are similarly situated to so-
called "legitimate" children. Nonetheless, the Court majority did not consider
such discrimination inherently suspect, because, in its opinion, "this
discrimination against illegitimates has never approached the severity or
pervasiveness of the historic legal and political discrimination against women
12. E.g., Matthews, 427 U.S. 495; cf, e.g., Ry. Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106,
110 (1949) (holding that equal protection analysis is satisfied when a classification "has relation to the
purpose for which it made and does not contain the kind of discrimination against which the Equal
Protection clause afford protection").
13. One rare exception is Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), in which the Supreme Court
struck down a state constitutional amendment that would have banned antidiscrimination laws and
ordinances benefiting homosexuals or bisexuals. The Court did not hold that sexual minorities belong to
a protected class; instead, it found the measure failed rational basis review.
14. Federal Commc'ns Comm'n v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 323 n.3 (1993)
(Stevens, J., concurring).
15. Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976) (citing San Antonio Sch. Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I, 28 (1973)).
16. Id.
17. Id. (citing Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28).
18. Matthews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 504-05 (1975).
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and Negroes." 19 The majority cited literally no evidence in support of this
naked assertion, nor did it offer any guidance as to what the standard
justifying heightened scrutiny would be. Similarly, the Court has never
explained why the benefits of heightened scrutiny are withheld from
homosexuals, who fulfill par excellence the criteria of a suspect class-all this
while proclaiming, with apparent sincerity, that the Equal Protection Clause
"'neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.'"20
The protected class approach offers the advantages of relative clarity
about prohibited grounds of discrimination and limitations on judicial review
of well-meaning legislation. But whatever the theoretical merits of the
approach, in practice it apparently poses difficulties of consistent application.
The limitation of rights to specific, identified classes invites favoritism in the
worst case and, in the best, susceptibility to the decisionmaker's cultural,
social, or other biases against the unprotected group. Ironically, these are
among the very biases that an equal protection standard should neutralize.
The effect of a denial of serious balancing of state and private interests
for most groups is to legitimize political discrimination when human rights
authorities such as the U.S. Supreme Court defer to the political branches of
government instead of justifying protection of a class rigorously and applying
the same rationale consistently to other classes laboring under similar
disadvantages. If, from social and political biases, the judicial authorities
refuse to recognize a vulnerable class as entitled to special protection-for
example, sexual minorities,21 or childless men and women 22 -the class may
receive no real protection. The Supreme Court's application of heightened
scrutiny to some classes and not others without evident justification does not
merely leave unprotected groups in no worse a situation; it positively validates
the state's discrimination against them by denying the relevance of the very
class characteristics that may have provoked the discrimination in the first
place.
III. ARTICLE 14 ECHR APPROACH
At first glance, Article 14 of the European Convention seems to take a
protected class approach, albeit with a much-expanded list of prohibited
grounds of discrimination. The appearance is merely superficial; the inclusion
of "or other status" leaves the list of prohibited grounds open-ended. This
was no accident; the travaux pr~paratoires of Protocol No. 12 to the
19. Id. at 506.
20. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 584 (2003) (quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537,
559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
21. See, e.g., Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties
Under Article 40 of the Covenant, 25, U.N. Doc. CCPR/CIUSA/CO/3/Rev.I (Dec. 18, 2006); Aaron
Xavier Fellmeth, State Regulation of Sexuality in International Human Rights Law and Theory, 50 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 797, 832 (2008).
22. See generally LAURIE LISLE, WITHOUT CHILD: CHALLENGING THE STIGMA OF
CHILDLESSNESS (1999) (describing the social and economic disadvantages suffered by women who
choose to remain childless); CAROLYN M. MORELL, UNWOMANLY CONDUCT: THE CHALLENGES OF
INTENTIONAL CHILDLESSNESS (1994) (same).
23. ECHR, supra note 3, art. 14.
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Convention make clear that the list was never intended to be exhaustive.24 The
European Convention does not, then, agree with the U.S. practice of
identifying only a limited class of persons who benefit from the equal
protection of the laws. In that sense, the Article 14 approach reaches a much
broader class of discrimination because a legal distinction operating to the
detriment of any person on the ground of some quality or characteristic of that
person could-at least theoretically-be grounds for condemnation of the
distinction as prohibited discrimination. This moves the European approach to
discrimination into the category of a universal right in the sense that all
persons have a right to equal treatment under law, in a more meaningful sense
than in U.S. practice, under which the great majority of individuals-not
belonging to a protected class-have no significant right to protection against
arbitrary discrimination.
The language of Article 14 does, however, contain a very consequential
limitation on this universal right. It applies only to discrimination impairing
"the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention."25 The Strasbourg Court
realizes the injustices that the limitation, if read literally, would sanction. A
limitless variety of arbitrary or oppressive state actions or omissions based
entirely on maliciously discriminatory motives could theoretically fall outside
of the protections of Article 14 so long as the unequal treatment did not
deprive the applicant of a right specifically enumerated in the Convention. If
the Convention specifies no right to parental leave in the case of childbirth
(and it does not), and a party to the Convention provides in its law for paternal
but not maternal leave, then there is no prohibited discrimination under the
literal terms of Article 14, because the discrimination impairs no right or
freedom set forth in the Convention. Clearly, this is not a sufficient minimum
guarantee of equal rights.
The Strasbourg Court has indirectly addressed this problem, but it has
done so inconsistently. It has taken the position that the "application of Art.
14, does not necessarily presuppose the violation of one of the substantive
rights protected by the Convention. It is necessary but it is also sufficient for
the facts of the case to fall 'within the ambit' of one or more" articles of the
Convention.26 The court has sometimes accordingly interpreted the ECHR to
provide a guarantee against arbitrary discrimination to the detriment of, not a
right specifically guaranteed by the Convention, but an interest that falls
within the same general subject matter as the human right.27 A state that grants
a benefit or imposes some burden "within the ambit" of a protected right may
not discriminate arbitrarily. Of course, the court has never defined clearly just
what kinds of treatment fall "within the ambit" of a Convention right and
24. See Protocol No. 12 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 2000, Europ. T.S. No. 177, available at http://conventions.coe.int/
Treaty/en/ReportslHtml/177.htm.
25. ECHR, supra note 3, art 14.
26. 26. E.B. v. France, App. No. 43456/02, para. 47 (Eur. Ct. Hum. Rts. Jan. 22, 2008)
(footnote omitted), available at http://www.echr.coe.int/.
27. See, e.g., Petrovic v. Austria, 1998-11 Eur. Ct. H.R. 579; Schmidt v. Germany, 291-B Eur.
Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1994); Abdulaziz v. United Kingdom, 94 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), paras. 68, 71, 79-82
(1985).
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which do not, which would seem to indicate a doctrine that is highly
discretionary or flexible. But the blame for the ambiguity cannot be laid at the
court's doorstep; when forced to choose between an unsatisfactory human
rights jurisprudence and absolving the state parties of liability for very serious
and arbitrary inequalities in treatment, the court has properly chosen the
former in recognition that, to tweak Reisman's phrasing a little, "in a crunch,
human beings and not perfectly consistent doctrines matter.,
27
IV. THE UNIVERSAL EQUAL RIGHTS APPROACH
The European Union and Council of Europe are evidently aware of the
challenge that Article 14 poses to a coherent human rights doctrine. The
nonbinding European Charter prohibits in Article 21 "any discrimination" on
the enumerated grounds, meaning discrimination with respect to any law.
28
Similarly, Optional Protocol No. 12 to the European Convention on Human
Rights (ECHR) extends the nondiscrimination obligation beyond the rights
enumerated to encompass unequal treatment under any law.29 The fact that
one of these instruments is nonbinding and the other optional (and not yet
widely subscribed) does not create any special problem because all major
international human rights conventions have similar prohibitions on
discrimination in any law and on any grounds.
30
Article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
prohibits "any discrimination" 31 that is, according to the Human Rights
Committee, "based on any ground.",32 Most state legislation discriminates
against some people based on their status. Every state discriminates based on
age in granting the right to vote. Progressive income taxes discriminate
against the wealthy. As the Strasbourg Court recognized, if such an
interpretation were accepted, "[o]ne would, in effect, be led to judge as
contrary to the Convention every one of the many legal or administrative
provisions which do not secure to everyone complete equality of
treatment .... 33 The court has accordingly defined discrimination to include
only differences in treatment "without an objective and reasonable
justification [of] persons in relevantly similar situations."' 34 The Inter-
27. See Reisman, supra note I and accompanying text.
28. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. 21, Dec. 7, 2000, 2000 O.J. (C
364) 1.
29. ECHR, supra note 3, art. 1.
30. See, e.g., CEDAW, supra note 2, art. 1; African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights
art. 19, June 27, 1981, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58; see also American Convention
on Human Rights art. 24, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123; International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights art. 26, Dec. 16, 1966, S. EXEC. Doc. E, 95-2 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171
[hereinafter ICCPR]; Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 7, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N.
GAOR, 3d. Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948); Office of the United Nations High
Comm'r for Human Rights [OHCHR], Human Rights Comm'n, General Comment No. 18: Non-
Discrimination, 12 (Nov. 10, 1989).
31. ICCPR, supra note 30, art. 26.
32. OHCHR, supra note 30,17.
33. Belgian Linguistic Case No. 2, 6 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) para. 10 (1968).
34. D.H. v. Czech Rep., App. No. 57325/00, para. 175 (Eur. Ct. Hum. Rts. Nov. 13, 2007)
(emphasis added) (citing Willis v. United Kingdom, 2002-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 311, para. 48), available at
http://www.echr.coe.int/.
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American Court of Human Rights has qualified the nondiscrimination right in
36a similar way, although in different words. In each case, an exception is
necessarily implied to allow the state to discriminate to the extent necessary
and proportional to protect the legitimate interests of a democratic society,
notwithstanding the sometimes absolute language of the prohibition on
discrimination.
The flexibility created by these qualifications allows human rights
decisionmakers to demand more cogent justifications for discrimination
adversely affecting vulnerable, disempowered, or politically or socially
disfavored groups, 38 or where the right is especially personal and sensitive to
infringement. 39 The protected class approach, in contrast, tends to rely on
heuristics that may or may not reflect social reality. Some groups, for
example, may suffer disproportionately from discrimination in some ways and
benefit from discrimination in others. A class approach tends to discourage
nuanced inquiry into the social, political, and economic consequences of
individual membership in the protected class. Under a universal rights
approach, decisionmakers are left free to evaluate government action or
inaction in social context and to weigh the degree of threat to the group
members against the benefit to other members of society. This does not mean
that the universal equal rights approach merges with the protected class
approach; far from it. The former is much more susceptible to fine tuning and
subjective judgment in balancing the interests of the state and affected
individuals. The universal rights approach accordingly invites greater judicial
or other human rights supervision of governmental action than universal
substantive rights, such as the right to free speech and conscience or the right
against torture, do. The human rights authority necessarily assumes the role of
ombudsman with respect to any governmental legislation and action that
operates to the detriment of any specific segment of society. This is at once an
empowering and perilous role for a decisionmaker such as a judge or Human
Rights Committee member. It is also a role that, as Frederick Schauer would
predict, tends to lead human rights decisionmakers to invent ways to
circumscribe their own authority through the adoption of narrowing rules 4 0 _-a
pertinent example being the Strasbourg Court's margin of appreciation
doctrine.4 1 On the other hand, when the decisionmaker hyperextends
nondiscrimination principles, as the Inter-American Court did when it
proclaimed that international law prohibits states from discriminating against
illegal immigrant workers by denying any benefit whatsoever granted to
36. See Juridical Condition and Human Rights of the Child, Advisory Opinion No. OC-I 7/02,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 17, at 56 (Aug. 28, 2002).
37. See, e.g., Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities art. 4, Feb. 1,
1995, 34 I.L.M. 351 (prohibiting "any discrimination" based on national minority group membership);
CEDAW, supra note 2, art. I (defining discrimination to mean "any distinction" based on sex).
38. See, e.g., Schuler-Zgraggen v. Switzerland, 263 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) paras. 64-67 (1993).
39. See, e.g., S.L. v. Austria, 2003-1 Eur. Ct. H.R. 71, para. 37; L. & V. v. Austria, 2003-1 Eur.
Ct. H.R. 29, para. 45.
40. See Frederick Schauer, The Tyranny of Choice and the Rulifcation of Standards, 14 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 803, 808 (2005).
41. See, e.g., Frett6 v. France, 2002-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 345.
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workers legitimately in the country-as a matter of jus cogens, no less42-
even avid human rights advocates cringe at the authority's self-undermining
potential.43
V. CONCLUSION
Treating nondiscrimination rights as universal rights runs contrary to the
U.S. approach and diverges from the European approach to date, but I hope
the foregoing discussion has demonstrated some advantages and risks of the
universal equal rights approach. A protected class approach is unavoidably
rigid and underinclusive. Human rights, as core values insusceptible to
simplistic definition, demand a certain flexibility in scope. The Article 14
ECHR approach offers more flexibility but also tends toward
underinclusiveness. The Strasbourg Court has mitigated that problem
somewhat through creative interpretation, but it remains improvisational.
This is not to characterize the universal equal protection approach as
some kind of panacea. Michael Reisman once observed that extending the
human rights program "into areas beyond enforcement capabilities" tends to
bleed away "the anger at atrocities, the motive force we bring to the program,
and the very scarce resources we have for its implementation." 4 The same
warning applies to the interjection into the process of balancing competing
political interests of human rights law in general, and the potentially all-
engulfing nondiscrimination right in particular. The Strasbourg Court, 4 5 Inter-
American Court,46 and other human rights authorities have wisely recognized
that, although the right to equal protection of the laws must include guarantees
against discrimination based on any grounds and in any kind of state action,
the right must also be tempered by limiting doctrines and restraint to avoid
undue interference in democratic politics.
42. See Juridical Condition and Rights of the Undocumented Migrants, Advisory Opinion No.
OC-18/03, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)No. 18, 101, 149, 153, 155 (Sept. 17, 2003).
43. See, e.g., James L. Cavallaro & Stephanie Erin Brewer, Reevaluating Regional Human
Rights Litigation in the Twenty-First Century: The Case of the Inter-American Court, 102 AM. J. INT'L
L. 768, 823 (2008).
44. W. Michael Reisman, Through or Despite Governments: Differentiated Responsibilities in
Human Rights Programs, 72 IOWA L. REv. 391, 393 (1987).
45. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
46. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
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